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How Veblenian Evolutionary Thinking Transcends 
Methodological Individualism and Methodological 
Collectivism 
 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson1 
 
The term ‘evolutionary economics’ describes a wide variety of 
views and approaches, some of which do not embrace ideas or 
analogies from biology.2 Nevertheless, the use of Darwinian 
mechanisms of variation, inheritance and selection is now quite 
widespread among evolutionary economists. However, the 
importance of Darwinism for economics involves more than mere 
analogy. The leading biologist and philosopher of biology Ernst Mayr 
(1964, p. xviii) rightly remarked: ‘It has taken 100 years to appreciate 
fully that Darwin’s conceptual framework is, indeed, a new 
philosophical system.’ The philosophical aspects of Darwinism are 
now more widely appreciated. A survey of about one thousand 
academic philosophers organised by the Philosopher’s Magazine put 
Darwin’s Origin of Species as the third most important book in 
philosophy ever, after Plato’s Republic and Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason.3 
It is a purpose of this paper to consider some of the 
philosophical implications of Darwinism to the social sciences, 
particularly concerning methodological individualism and 
methodological collectivism. Over a hundred years ago, Thorstein 
Veblen used Darwinian ideas to begin the transformation of 
economics into an evolutionary science. This essay shows how 
Veblen did this, and considers the methodological implications. 
Veblen’s Darwinian position is established as quite different from 
both methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. 
This paper is organised in four sections. The first section 
explores the meaning of Darwinism and its relevance for the social 
sciences. The second section shows how Veblen applied Darwinian 
principles to economics. The third section show how Veblen, in line 
with these principles, implicitly ruled out both methodological 
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2 This essay makes use of material from Hodgson (2004). The author is very 
grateful to an anonymous referee and many others for discussions and 
comments. 
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individualism and methodological collectivism. Contrary to 
widespread supposition, Veblen did not explain individual behaviour 




1. The meaning of Darwinism 
 
Darwin did not only proclaim that species had evolved, but 
also pointed to the causal mechanisms of evolution. Darwin’s life 
work was marked by an ambition to extend the realm of causal 
explanation into areas that were deemed taboo by religious doctrine. 
Darwin rejected explanations of natural phenomena in terms of 
design, to focus instead on the detailed physical or ‘efficient’ causes 
that had cumulated in the emergence of elaborate phenomena over 
long periods of time. 
Darwin was aware that his Origin of Species offered far from a 
complete explanation of all aspects of evolution, and expressed a 
profound ignorance of the mechanisms that led to variations in 
organisms (Darwin, 1859, p. 167). But he did not believe that 
variations emerged spontaneously, in the sense of being without a 
cause. Darwin (1859, p. 209) asserted that such ‘accidental 
variations’ must be ‘produced by … unknown causes’ rather than 
embracing a notion of a spontaneous, uncaused event. 
Darwin believed that relatively simple mechanisms of cause 
and effect could, given time and circumstances, lead to amazingly 
complex and varied outcomes. Darwin upheld that complex 
outcomes could be explained in terms of a detailed succession and 
accumulation of step-by-step causal mechanisms. Darwin (1859, p. 
43) wrote of the supreme importance of ‘the accumulative action of 
Selection’. Darwin’s famous maxim, ‘natura non facit saltum’ (nature 
does not make leaps) was in part an appeal to this method of 
detailed, sequential causal explanation. Darwin did not simply argue 
that natural selection worked slowly, he also – and more importantly 
– upheld that each step was susceptible to causal explanation. 
This doctrine applied to the most sophisticated and complex 
outcomes of evolution, such as the eye and human consciousness. 
Accordingly, there were neither sudden nor miraculous leaps in the 
evolution of human intentionality. Like all human attributes, they 
must have been prefigured in the species from which humans are 
descended. In this way the causal origin of these features is 
susceptible to explanation. Darwin (1859, p. 208) thus wrote: ‘A little 
dose … of judgement or reason often comes into play, even in 
animals very low in the scale of nature.’ 
Darwin’s devoted follower, Thomas Henry Huxley, had similar 
views to Darwin concerning causality and the aims of science. For 
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Huxley the idea of uncaused and spontaneous event was absurd and 
unacceptable. Science was nothing less than an ongoing endeavour 
to reveal the causes behind phenomena. Huxley (1894, vol. 1, pp. 
158-9) wrote: 
“any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, 
that its progress has, in all ages meant, and now, more than ever, 
means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and 
causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all 
regions of thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.” 
Similarly, George Romanes – a friend of Darwin and Huxley – 
also insisted that Darwinism above all meant causal analysis. For 
Romanes (1893, p. 5), taxonomy and the accumulation of facts were 
the means, but not the goal, of science. ‘Not facts, then, but causes 
or principles are the ultimate objects of scientific quest.’ In another 
passage, Romanes explained that a goal of Darwinism was to extend 
the type of causal explanation that was applicable to mechanical 
phenomena into the organic world. Romanes (1893, p. 402) argued 
that Darwinism 
“seeks to bring the phenomena of organic nature into line with 
those of inorganic; and therefore to show that whatever view we 
may severally take as to the kind of causation which is 
energizing in the latter we must now extend to the former. … 
the theory of evolution by natural selection … endeavours to 
comprise all the facts of adaptation in organic nature under the 
same category of explanation as those which occur in inorganic 
nature – that is to say, under the category of physical, or 
ascertainable, causation.” 
Darwinism brought not only human evolution, but also the 
human mind and consciousness within the realms of science. Much 
of human physiology could be explained by natural selection; 
Darwinism thus brought the frontier of scientific enquiry to the inner 
workings of the human mind. 
Darwinism is rightly associated with the ideas of variation, 
inheritance and selection. However, underlying this theory of 
evolution are philosophical principles that are even more 
fundamental to Darwinism. At this point it would be useful to clarify 
and take stock of these five key Darwinian philosophical principles. 
(1) The principle of determinacy. This is otherwise known in 
philosophy as ‘the principle of universal causation’ or sometimes 
‘ubiquity determinism’. Its rough and ready expression is ‘every event 
has a cause’, and more precisely, everything is determined in 
accordance with laws by something else. 
The principle of determinacy does not imply that events are 
necessarily predictable, or that any one set of events will always lead 
to the same, regular outcome. These versions of ‘determinism’ are 
not adopted here. Furthermore, the principle of determinacy does not 
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imply a ‘mechanistic’ view. ‘Mechanistic’ views are said to exclude 
intentionality, but intentionality is here acknowledged and included. 
The principle of determinacy upholds that intentions are caused, but 
this does not diminish the reality or responsibility of will or choice.4 
(2) The doctrine of continuity. A species is a causal and evolutionary 
outcome of accumulated gradations and variations, with organisms 
that inherit and preserve most of their characteristics through time. 
It is upheld that complex outcomes are the result of accumulated, 
incremental changes. Miraculous leaps and teleological 
determination are excluded. This means that human intentionality 
has itself evolved gradually through time. In general, continuity 
involves mechanisms of inheritance upon which slight generational 
variations are accumulated. 
(3) Cumulative causal explanation. The idea of causal explanation 
is applied sequentially to these step-by-step developments. 
Accordingly, their explanation involves tracing this causal process by 
focusing on its key processual algorithms. Even if every step in the 
process cannot be determined in detail; the exploration of the 
algorithmic process helps to provide an explanation. The key 
algorithmic process emphasised by Darwin was natural selection. 
However, the concept of selection in Darwinism necessarily invokes 
neither competition nor militant struggle. 
(4) The principle of evolutionary explanation. It follows from the 
above that any behavioural assumption, including in the social 
sciences, must be capable of cumulative causal explanation in 
evolutionary terms, or at least be consistent with a scientific 
understanding of human evolution. Other sciences are not mere 
extensions of biology: but they must be consistent with an acceptable 
version of it. In particular, if there are biological constraints or 
influences on human capacities or behaviours, then they should be 
neither contradicted nor negated by assumptions at the 
psychological or social levels. 
(5) The principle of consistency of the sciences. This is a 
generalisation of the sixth principle: any scientific assumption or 
principle at a specific ontological level must be consistent with a 
scientific understanding of all lower ontological levels. For example, 
the social sciences are not reducible to psychology, biology, 
chemistry or physics, but they must be consistent with acceptable 
versions of these sciences. 
There are other Darwinian ontological principles that there is 
not the space to explore here. Among these are Darwin’s ‘population 
thinking’ (Mayr, 1964, 1988, 1992) and an approach that Bunge 
 
4 Notably, in his early works, Dewey (1910, 1922) elaborated a similar 
position, as discussed in Hodgson (2004). 
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(1980) has described as ‘emergentist materialism’. Emergentist 
materialism rejects multiple and independent forms of being, where 
one type of substance (notably mind) is treated as entirely separate 
from and independent of another (notably matter); the mental level is 
understood in terms of emergent properties of organised matter. 
What has been argued here is that Darwinism itself 
presupposes several important ontological methodological 
presuppositions. These presuppositions apply to the socio-economic 
as well as the biological realm. We now examine the way in which 
Veblen understood and applied these Darwinian ideas. 
 
 
2. Veblen’s application of Darwinism to economics 
 
Veblen (1898a, p. 393) wrote: ‘an evolutionary economics 
must be a theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by 
the economic interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic 
institutions stated in terms of the process itself.’ In a key passage, 
Veblen (1899, p. 188) declared: 
“The life of man in society, just like the life of other species, is a 
struggle for existence, and therefore it is a process of selective 
adaptation. The evolution of social structure has been a 
process of natural selection of institutions. The progress which 
has been and is being made in human institutions and in 
human character may be set down, broadly, to a natural 
selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a process of 
enforced adaptation of individuals to an environment which 
has progressively changed with the growth of community and 
with the changing institutions under which men have lived. 
Institutions are not only themselves the result of a selective 
and adaptive process which shapes the prevailing or dominant 
types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; they are at the same 
time special methods of life and human relations, and are 
therefore in their turn efficient factors of selection. So that the 
changing institutions in their turn make for a further selection 
of individuals endowed with the fittest temperament, and a 
further adaptation of individual temperament and habits to the 
changing environment through the formation of new 
institutions.” 
It was no accident that Darwin’s phrases ‘natural selection’ 
and ‘struggle for existence’ appeared here. Veblen (1899, p. 207) 
wrote also in the same work of ‘the law of natural selection, as 
applied to human institutions’. Apparently without of the knowledge 
of David Ritchie’s (1896) similar insight, Veblen became the second 
writer after the publication of the Origin of Species to apply with 
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some rigour Darwin’s principle of selection to the evolution of 
customs and institutions. 
“The decisive implication here was to open up the possibility that 
Darwinism could be applied to human society without necessarily 
reducing explanations of social phenomena entirely to individual 
psychology or biology. Once we consider the natural selection of 
institutions, and in turn treat institutions as emergent properties 
in the social realm, then that road is opened.” 
Veblen also appreciated the philosophical underpinnings of 
Darwinism. There is abundant evidence that Veblen understood 
Darwinism most fundamentally in terms of a commitment to detailed 
and sequential causal analysis. For example, Veblen (1898a, pp. 
375-8) wrote: 
“Any evolutionary science … is a close-knit body of theory. It is 
a theory of a process, of an unfolding sequence … of 
cumulative causation. The great deserts of the evolutionist 
leaders ... lie ... in their having shown how this colorless 
impersonal sequence of cause and effect can be made use of for 
theory proper, by virtue of its cumulative character.” 
This insistence on explanation in terms of a cumulative 
causal sequence was repeated in several works (Veblen, 1898a, pp. 
381, 384, 386; 1900, p. 266; 1904, pp. 67, 313, 314, 365). Although 
Darwin himself did not use the term ‘cumulative causation’, it is 
important to underline the way that Veblen saw it as linked with 
Darwinism. In some passages, Veblen (1904, p. 370) made the link 
with Darwin explicit: 
“His [Darwin’s] inquiry characteristically confines itself to the 
process of cumulative change. His results, as well as his 
specific determination of the factors at work in this process of 
cumulative change, have been questioned; perhaps they are 
open to all the criticisms levelled against them as well as a few 
more not thought of; but the scope and method given to 
scientific enquiry by Darwin and the generation whose 
spokesman he is has substantially not been questioned, except 
by that diminishing contingent of the faithful …” 
Veblen’s key point of emphasis was one of causal sequence. 
Veblen (1919, p. 37) visited this theme persistently, as in this essay 
of 1908: 
“The characteristic feature by which post-Darwinian science is 
contrasted with what went before is a new distribution of 
emphasis, whereby the process of causation, the interval of 
instability and transition between initial cause and definitive 
effect, has come to take the first place in the inquiry; instead of 
that consummation in which causal effect was once presumed to 
come to rest. This change in point of view was, of course, not 
abrupt or catastrophic. But it has latterly gone so far that modern 
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science is becoming substantially a theory of the process of 
consecutive change, realized to be self-continuing or self-
propagating and to have no final term.” 
In the same year Veblen (1908, p. 159 n.) wrote of ‘the field of 
cumulative change within which the modern post-Darwinian 
sciences live and move and have their being.’ Only a few 
commentators on Veblen have recognised this crucial Darwinian 
focus on causal processes in Veblen’s writings. As Karl Anderson 
(1933, p. 602) put it, modern science for Veblen ‘demands an 
explanation of things in terms of cause and effect, and postulates 
that the causal relationship has neither starting-point nor stopping-
point but runs in an endless sequence.’ Similarly, Idus Murphree 
(1959, p. 312) remarked that Veblen ‘thought of the Darwinian 
method as one that revealed the impersonal sequence of mechanical 
cause and effect and dispensed with a search for universal purposes 
and belief in a “natural order”.’ 
Overall, in Veblen’s writing there was the same emphasis on 
the detailed and processual nature of Darwinian evolution as in the 
modern work of Daniel Dennett (1995). Although Veblen did not use 
the same word, he had as much appreciation as Dennett of the 
nature of Darwinian evolution as an ‘algorithmic’ process. Veblen 
used phrases such as ‘cumulative causation’, ‘theory of a process, of 
an unfolding sequence’ and ‘impersonal sequence of cause and effect’ 
to connote the same idea. This focus on algorithmic processes is both 
revolutionary and highly modern; it directs attention to ongoing 
processes rather than static equilibria.5 
However, while Veblen coined the term ‘cumulative’ 
causation, he used it primarily to refer to cumulative sequences of 
cause and effect. With other authors, the term ‘cumulative causation’ 
took on the different meaning (in modern parlance) of non-linear 
processes of positive feedback (Young, 1928; Kaldor, 1985; Myrdal, 
1939). 
Another prominent Darwinian theme in Veblen’s writings was 
his attempt to reconcile the reality of human will and intentionality 
with science and causal explanations. Veblen neither denied nor 
 
5 However, the differences in approach between Dennett and Veblen should 
not be overlooked. For example, Dennett’s (1995) devotion to the vague 
concept of the ‘meme’ as the unit of cultural evolution contrasts with 
Veblen’s pragmatist insistence on habit as the basis of ideas and essence of 
culture and his emphasis on emergent institutions as units of selection. One 
of the problems with ‘memetics’ is that the causes of meme replication are 
unexplained, while Veblen explained the replication of institutions in terms 
of the psychological mechanisms of individual habit formation. Furthermore, 
Veblen’s (1909a, p. 300) strictures against reductionism have no adequate 
parallel in Dennett (1995). 
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underestimated the significance of human intentionality, but saw it 
as a result of evolution. Darwin rejected religious and teleological 
explanations of origin or destiny. Veblen rejected them too, while 
attempting to leave an intermediate place for ‘teleology’ in human 
purposeful behaviour. He retained the idea that persons were 
purposeful, but Veblen (1898b, pp. 180-93) placed this proposition 
within an evolutionary framework: 
“Like other animals, man is an agent that acts in response to 
stimuli afforded by the environment in which he lives. Like other 
species, he is a creature of habit and propensity. But in a higher 
degree than other species, man mentally digests the content of 
habits under whose guidance he acts, and appreciates the trend 
of these habits and propensities. ... By selective necessity he is 
endowed with a proclivity for purposeful action. ... He acts under 
the guidance of propensities which have been imposed upon him 
by the process of selection to which he owes his differentiation 
from other species.” 
Hence Veblen followed Darwin and regarded human 
intentionality as a capacity that had itself evolved through natural 
selection. As Veblen (1899, p. 15) put it in another work, the capacity 
of humankind to act with deliberation towards ends was itself a 
result of natural selection: 
“As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He is, in his 
own apprehension, a centre of unfolding impulsive activity – 
‘teleological’ activity. He is an agent seeking in every act the 
accomplishment of some concrete, objective, impersonal end.” 
Despite this, Veblen is widely misunderstood as 
underestimating the actuality or significance of human intentionality 
and purposefulness. On the contrary, Veblen (1898a, p. 391) 
insisted: ‘Economic action is teleological, in the sense that men 
always and everywhere seek to do something.’ The fact that such 
purposeful behaviour itself emerged through evolutionary selection 
does not mean a denial of the reality of purposeful behaviour. 
Instead, Veblen consistently tried to reconcile a notion of individual 
purposefulness (or sufficient reason) with his materialist idea of 
causality (or efficient cause). 
Intentions can be causes, but intentions are always caused. 
The evolution of human intentionality, and its development within 
each human being, had to be explained in terms of materialist 
causes and evolutionary selection. As noted above, this is an aspect 
of the Darwinian doctrine of continuity. Accordingly, like Darwin, 
Huxley, Lewes and Morgan, Veblen rejected a dualist or Cartesian 
ontology that separated intentionality completely from matter and 
materialist causality. Veblen (1909b, pp. 624-5) saw such a dualism 
as unacceptable for the following reason: 
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“The two methods of inference – from sufficient reason [or 
intention] and from efficient [or materialist] cause – are out of 
touch with one another and there is no transition from one to 
the other: no method of converting the procedure or the results 
of the one into those of the other.”  
Others since have echoed Veblen’s argument against the idea 
of separate types of cause, and against the related Cartesian dualism 
of matter and mind. For example, Barry Hindess (1989, p. 150) 
asked pertinently: ‘If human action is subject to two distinct modes 
of determination, what happens when they conflict, when 
intentionality pushes one way and causality pushes another?’ We do 
not and cannot know the answer, because to reach it would involve 
the reconciliation of irreconcilables. John Searle (1997, pp. xii-xiii) 
similarly remarked: ‘dualism ... seems a hopeless theory because, 
having made a strict distinction between the mental and the 
physical, it cannot make the relation of the two intelligible.’ Mario 
Bunge (1980, p. 20) put it in a nutshell: ‘Dualism is inconsistent with 
the ontology of science.’ 
Veblen perceived the consequences for the social sciences of 
this mistaken dualism. For example: ‘The immediate consequence is 
that the resulting economic theory is of a teleological character – 
“deductive” or “a priori” as it is often called – instead of being drawn 
in terms of cause and effect’ (Veblen, 1909b, p. 625). His solution, 
following Darwin, was to place human intentionality in an 
evolutionary context. At least in principle, consciousness had to be 
explained in Darwinian and evolutionary terms. As Veblen (1906a, p. 
589) alluded: ‘While knowledge is construed in teleological terms, in 
terms of personal interest and attention, this teleological aptitude is 
itself reducible to a product of unteleological natural selection.’ In the 
following passage, Veblen (1909b, p. 625) explained in more detail: 
“The modern scheme of knowledge, on the whole, rests, for its 
definitive ground, on the relation of cause and effect; the relation 
of sufficient reason [or intention] being admitted only provisionally 
and as a proximate factor in that analysis, always with the 
unambiguous reservation that the analysis must ultimately come 
to rest in terms of cause and effect.” 
But this does mean that intentionality (or sufficient reason) is 
nonexistent or unimportant. On the contrary, Veblen (1909b, p. 623 
n.) saw the existence of a ‘rational faculty in man’ as implying that 
‘the connection between stimulus and response is teleological’. 
Veblen (1909b, p. 625) acknowledged in similar terms ‘that the 
relation of sufficient reason enters very substantially into human 
conduct. It is this element of discriminating forethought that 
distinguishes human conduct from brute behavior.’ Veblen (1909b, 
p. 626) then went on to observe and approve that ‘modern science at 
large has made the causal relation the sole ultimate ground of 
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theoretical formulation’. Veblen saw ‘the relation of sufficient reason 
as a proximate, supplementary, or intermediate ground, subsidiary, 
and subservient to the argument from cause to effect.’ 
In sum, while human intentionality is real and consequential, 
and a necessary element in any causal explanation in the social 
sciences, intentions themselves had also to be explained. As Veblen 
(1909b, p. 626) put it, explanation could not be confined to the 
‘rationalistic, teleological terms of calculation and choice’ because 
the psychological beliefs and mechanisms that lay behind 
deliberation and preferences had also to be explained in terms of a 
‘sequence of cause and effect, by force of such elements as 
habituation and conventional requirements.’ By embracing the need 
for such causal explanations, Veblen rejected both the assumption of 
the given individual in neoclassical economics and the opposite error 
of regarding human agency as entirely an outcome of mysterious 
social forces. 
Veblen’s position on intentionality has been the subject of 
some misunderstanding. David Seckler (1975, p. 56) came to the 
verdict that Veblen ‘teeters between free will and determinism’. But 
Veblen acknowledged the reality of purposeful behaviour. While 
Seckler (1975, p. 86) accepted the ‘methodological dualism’ of Ludwig 
von Mises (1949) and others, Veblen (1898a, p. 386) argued in 
contrast that the dualist position of the Austrian school should be 
dissolved by bringing purposes and preferences within the orbit of 
scientific explanation. What Seckler failed to understand was that 
Veblen was trying to overcome the problems of dualism. Veblen was 
not trying to dispense with human will but to reconcile it with 
materialist causality. Veblen was trying to locate a different, more 
complex and more satisfactory position that rejected determinism in 
some of its versions, upheld the principle of determinacy, and saw 
human will as real but caused. 
Veblen used the idea of an unbroken historical chain of cause 
and effect to undermine the presuppositions of mainstream 
economics. His use of Darwinian methodological injunctions led to a 
powerful critique. Ultimately, because the human agent was a 
subject of an evolutionary process, he or she could not be taken as 
fixed or given. A causal account of the interaction between the 
individual and social structure had to be provided. This causal 
account should not stop with the individual, but it should also 
attempt to explain the origin of psychological purposes and 
preferences. 
Veblen argued that a problem with mainstream economics 
was that it provided a causal and evolutionary explanation neither of 
‘rational economic man’ nor of his given preference function 
(Argyrous and Sethi, 1996; Hodgson, 1998). How did such rationality 
and preferences appear in human evolution? What causes and 
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processes brought them into being? How and when are they formed 
in the development of each human individual? For Veblen, such an 
escape from evolutionary principles was impossible. Darwinism 
meant not only a critique of Divine intervention, but it also required 
a rejection of immanently conceived preference functions. As a 
result, the universal assumption in neoclassical economics ‘of a 
passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature’ 
(Veblen, 1898a, p. 389) had to be criticised. 
Veblen thus argued that utilitarian and hedonistic 
explanations of human behaviour were too limited, in part because 
they did not encompass an evolutionary and causal explanation of 
the origin of the assumed behavioural characteristics. The 
neoclassical assumption of given preferences side-steps an 
explanation of the origin and initial acquisition of those preferences. 
The assumption that individuals are selfish requires an explanation 
of the evolution of selfishness. In general, postulates about human 
behaviour at the socio-economic level themselves require explanation 
in evolutionary terms. 
Veblen’s criticism challenged the narrow definition of 
economics as ‘the science of choice’. At a particular level of 
abstraction, it may be appropriate to consider the consequences of 
individual choices with fixed preferences, but the Darwinian 
perspective also obliges us eventually to consider the origin and 
evolution of those preferences. If economics is confined to fixed 
preferences, which are simply assumed at the outset, then it has to 
admit that it is limited in scope and that the narrow-defined 
‘economic approach’ cannot explain everything. It would be better if 
the scope of economics were broadened, to include the explanation of 
the origin and variation of preferences themselves. Individual 
preferences have to be placed in the context of both individual 
development and the evolution of the human species. 
Once we address human evolution, we must consider the 
possibility that at least some versions of ‘rational economic man’ 
would not emerge through evolutionary selection. As Veblen (1898b, 
p. 188) wrote with characteristic irony: 
“But if this economic man is to serve as a lay figure upon which to 
fit the garment of economic doctrines, it is incumbent upon the 
science to explain what are his limitations and how he has 
achieved his emancipation from the law of natural selection.” 
Veblen rightly argued that if ‘economic man’ is assumed then 
his evolution must be explained. Veblen made the valid 
methodological injunction that any assumptions concerning the 
human agent must be capable of explanation in evolutionary terms: 
the assumptions of economics and other social sciences should 
consistent with Darwinism and our understanding of human 
evolution. This did not itself imply that all explanations had to be 
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reduced to instincts. One of his underlying arguments is that any 
assumptions made concerning human nature or motivation should 
be consistent with those human attributes that have resulted from 
natural selection over hundreds of thousands of years. In this 
respect Veblen followed William James (1890), who made a supreme 
effort to reconcile psychology with the insights of Darwinism. 
Accordingly, Veblen upheld both the principle of evolutionary 
explanation and the principle of consistency of the sciences. 
As well as the assumption of the given individual, the 
principle of evolutionary explanation also challenges the largely role-
driven picture of the individual in much of twentieth-century 
sociology. If the individual were to be explained in terms of social 
roles, then it would be necessary to explain how those roles and the 
individual propensity to conform to them evolved. This would place 
role-driven sociology in some difficulty, as such an account would be 
forced to consider both the psychology of individual motivation and 
the individual and social mechanisms by which roles are created and 
reproduced. These aspects of social theory are subordinated if roles 
are made the drivers of action. 
 
3. The Rejection of Methodological Individualism and 
Methodological Collectivism 
 
Broadly, methodological individualism emphasises the human 
agent. Ludwig Lachmann (1969, p. 94) asserted that methodological 
individualism means ‘that we shall not be satisfied with any type of 
explanation of social phenomena which does not lead us ultimately 
to a human plan.’ But very few social scientists would deny the role 
of individual intentions in the explanation of social phenomena. In 
another attempt Jon Elster (1982, p. 453) defined methodological 
individualism as ‘the doctrine that all social phenomena (their 
structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms 
of individuals – their properties, goals, and beliefs.’ Being less banal, 
this definition also is not sufficiently precise, as it fails to clarify 
whether interactions between individuals or social structures are 
‘properties … of individuals’ or not. If individual interactions or social 
structures are not ‘properties of individuals’, then this narrower and 
more meaningful notion of methodological individualism can be 
deemed a failure, for the reasons given below. 
Much of the confusion in the debate over methodological 
individualism stems from whether methodological individualism 
means explanations (a) in terms of individuals alone, or (b) in terms 
of individuals plus individual interactions or social structures. If it 
means (b), then few would disagree. If social structures or 
interactions between individuals are also an essential part of the 
doctrine, then it is misleading to give the individual exclusive 
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representation in its chosen label. Such an inclusive notion would 
not warrant the title of methodological individualism any more than 
the description ‘methodological structuralism’. 
A more meaningful definition of methodological individualism 
is the injunction that socio-economic phenomena must be explained 
exclusively in terms of individuals. Methodological collectivism is 
symmetrically defined as the injunction that socio-economic 
phenomena must be explained exclusively in terms of socio-economic 
wholes, structures, institutions or cultures. Veblen used neither 
term, but implicitly rejected both doctrines. 
Veblen’s approach was to conceive of both agency and 
structure as a result of an evolutionary process. In particular, he saw 
human agency and purposefulness as a result of evolution at both 
biological and social levels. Purposeful behaviour was the result of 
both inherited instinct and the material and cultural environment 
within which the individual is situated. These led to the formation of 
habits, which acted as the grounding of purposes and beliefs. 
Methodological individualism, in the more meaningful sense, 
ultimately requires the assumption that individuals are given 
(Hodgson, 1988). If individuals are not taken as given, then they too 
must be explained, and this either undermines explanations in terms 
of individuals alone, or leads to an infinite regress. Hence Veblen’s 
critique of the notion that individuals should be taken as a given in 
social science undermines methodological individualism. 
One of Veblen’s clearest statements of his general position on 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism was 
made in his article on ‘The Limitations of Marginal Utility’ in the 
Journal of Political Economy. Because of its importance regarding this 
central methodological question in social theory, the relevant passage 
will be quoted almost in its entirety. Veblen (1909b, pp. 628-9) 
started by pointing out that the assumption of given individuals 
under given institutional conditions would lead to static outcomes: 
Evidently an economic inquiry which occupies itself 
exclusively with the movements of this consistent, elemental human 
nature under given, stable institutional conditions – such as is the 
case with the current hedonistic economics – can reach statical 
results alone; since it makes abstraction from those elements that 
make for anything but a statical result. 
Veblen (1909b, p. 629) then made it clear that institutions 
serve not merely as constraints, but also they affect the very wants 
and preferences of individuals themselves: 
“Not only is the individual’s conduct hedged about and directed 
by his habitual relations to his fellows in the group, but these 
relations, being of an institutional character, vary as the 
institutional scene varies. The wants and desires, the end and the 
aim, the ways and the means, the amplitude and drift of the 
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individual’s conduct are functions of an institutional variable that 
is of a highly complex and wholly unstable character.”  
This statement amounts to a strong assertion of the 
reconstitutive power of institutions over individuals. Institutional 
changes affect individual ‘wants and desires’. Preferences are 
endogenous, rather than exogenously given. Nevertheless, he acted 
immediately to forestall any misunderstanding that this strong 
downward causation amounted to a methodological collectivism. He 
did not believe that the social wholes entirely determine the 
individual parts. Veblen (1909b, p. 629) made it absolutely clear that 
the individual was still causally effective, that institutions were a 
product of individuals in a group, and institutions could not exist 
without individuals: 
“The growth and mutations of the institutional fabric are an 
outcome of the conduct of the individual members of the group, 
since it is out of the experience of the individuals, through the 
habituation of individuals, that institutions arise; and it is in this 
same experience that these institutions act to direct and define 
the aims and end of conduct. It is, of course, on individuals that 
the system of institutions imposes those conventional standards, 
ideals, and canons of conduct that make up the community’s 
scheme of life. Scientific inquiry in this field therefore, must deal 
with individual conduct and must formulate its theoretical results 
in terms of individual conduct.” 
However, the above passage does not amount to an assertion 
of methodological individualism, as defined here. Instead, Veblen 
upheld that individuals could not be removed from the picture, and 
he placed the individual in its social context. Veblen (1909b, pp. 629-
30) insisted that a complete and detailed causal explanation – that is 
what he meant by ‘a genetic theory’6 – means an explanation of how 
the individual acquires relevant habits of thought and behaviour: 
“But such an inquiry can serve the purposes of a genetic theory 
only if and in so far as this individual conduct is attended to in 
those respects in which it counts toward habituation, and so 
toward change (or stability) of the institutional fabric, on the one 
hand, and in those respects in which it is prompted and guided 




6 Explaining this, Veblen (1903, p. 655) wrote: ‘This method is the genetic 
one, which deals with the forces and sequence of development and seeks to 
understand the outcome by finding how and why it has come about. The aim 
is to organize social phenomena into a theoretical structure in causal terms.’ 
Clearly, this has nothing to do with the modern concept of the gene. 
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Veblen (1909b, p. 630) then went on to criticise those 
mainstream economists who ‘disregard or abstract from the causal 
sequence of propensity and habituation in economic life and exclude 
from theoretical inquiry all such interest in the facts of cultural 
growth’. By emphasising ‘cumulative causation’ and ‘continuity of 
cause and effect’ Veblen broke from any idea that explanations could 
ultimately be reduced to one type of entity or level. No such 
reduction is admissible within his Darwinian framework because all 
such elements have themselves to be explained in causal terms. As 
the philosopher of biology Elliott Sober (1981, p. 95) put it: 
‘Causality, in virtue of its transitivity, gives aid and comfort neither 
to the holist nor to the individualist. The causal chain just keeps 
rolling along.’ 
In sum, by rejecting both the individual and society as the 
ultimate unit of explanation, Veblen distanced himself from both 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. His 
solution was to adopt an evolutionary framework of explanation. 
Above all, Veblen’s position does not give solace to any form of 
(biological, cultural, structuralist or individualist) reductionism. 
Veblenian institutionalism shares with several other modern 
perspectives – including critical realism (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 
1989) and structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) – the endorsement of 
the following four propositions: 
(a) The dependence of social structures upon individuals. 
Social structures would not exist if individuals ceased to exist. 
Individuals through their actions may create, confirm, reproduce, 
replicate, transform or destroy social structures, either intentionally 
or unintentionally. 
(b) The rejection of methodological individualism. 
Nevertheless, social structures cannot be explained entirely in terms 
of individuals and their relations. They are not reducible, in an 
ontological or an explanatory sense, to individuals alone. 
(c) The dependence of individuals upon social structures. For 
their socialisation, survival and interaction, individuals depend upon 
social structures, and individual behaviour is significantly affected 
by its socio-structural context. 
(d) The rejection of methodological collectivism. Nevertheless, 
individual behaviours cannot be explained entirely in terms of the 
social structures in which they are located. Such reductionist 
explanations are invalid.  
These four propositions are implicit in the writing of Veblen. 
These four propositions amount to the notion that individuals and 
social structure are mutually constitutive. These four propositions are 
elemental for any viable and non-reductionist social theory. But 
much more is required, including an attempt to give these 
propositions some theoretical flesh and blood. 
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In addition, Veblen shared with Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, 
George Henry Lewes, Émile Durkheim and others the insight that we 
are born into a world of many institutions that are not of our 
making. Hence there is a temporal asymmetry: although structures 
depend for their existence on a group of individuals, for each single 
individual, several structures precede agency. However, this insight 
rules out the central conflation of Giddens (1984) where actor and 
structure are seen as facets of a combined process. Giddens’s 
structuration theory treats structure and agency as not only 
mutually constitutive but also conjoined. On the contrary, while 
people can change and be changed by social structures, they do not 
choose or create the structures and institutions into which they are 
born. Agents and structures are not different aspects of the same 
things or processes but different entities. 
Veblen recognised this temporal asymmetry and thereby the 
weight of the past on human decisions and actions. For example, 
Veblen (1898a, p. 392-3) wrote of economic evolution in the following 
terms: 
“the base of action – the point of departure – at any step in the 
process is the entire organic complex of habits of thought that 
have been shaped by past processes. The … expression of each is 
affected by habits of life formed under the guidance of all the 
rest.” 
Similarly, in The Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen (1899, p. 
191) argued: 
“The institutions – that is to say the habits of thought – under the 
guidance of which men live are in this way received from an 
earlier time; more or less remotely earlier, but in any event they 
have been elaborated in and received from the past.” 
Again, Veblen (1914, pp. 6-7) explained in The Instinct of 
Workmanship: 
“The apparatus of ways and means available for the pursuit of 
whatever may be worth seeking is, substantially all, a matter of 
tradition out of the past, a legacy of habits of thought 
accumulated through the experience of past generations.” 
By rejecting the unexplained given individual as a 
fundamental explanatory unit, Veblen focused on the weight of the 
past on individual expectations and choices. Veblen (1915, p. 132) 
thus wrote of the ‘restraining dead hand’ of the past. To take the 
individual as given would be to amputate this aspect of the past; to 
take institutions as given would cut off another causal process. The 
Veblenian restoration of the mechanisms by which the past bears 
upon the present has major implications for economic and social 
theory. It demarcates the whole tradition of institutional economics 
not only from the mainstream assumption of given preference 
functions, but also from those in the Keynesian tradition who 
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emphasise expectations of the future without also paying heed to the 
formation of expectations by means of understandings and 
cognitions acquired in the past (Hodgson, 1988). To take stock at 
this point, we note Veblen’s concordance with a fifth proposition for 
social theory: 
(e) The temporal priority of society over any one individual. 
Individual interactions with society are engagements with something 
already made. In this sense, several social structures pre-date any 
one individual. As individuals we do not make society: it is there in 
some form at our birth, bearing the marks of the past practices of 
former generations. This temporal cleavage establishes social 
structures and society as entities distinct from individuals (or mere 
aggregates of individuals), at least because of the structural legacy 
bequeathed by past actors, and separates structure and agency as 
distinct but interconnected objects of investigation. 
Social structures can be changed, but the starting point is 
not of our choosing. This fifth proposition breaks the conceptual 
symmetry of actor and structure and opens the door to time and 
history (Archer, 1995). Several modern social theorists would 
endorse the five propositions above: they are also consistent with 
some versions of Marxism. 
For Veblen, institutions were outcomes of individual 
habituations and interactions, but exhibited distinctive properties 
that were not reducible to the properties of individuals themselves. 
Furthermore, Veblen (1899, p. 212) considered the powers of 
an institution over individuals in the following terms: 
“So soon as it has won acceptance as an authoritative standard 
or norm of life it will react upon the character of the members of 
the society which has accepted it as a norm. It will to some 
extent shape their habits of thought and will exercise a selective 
surveillance over the development of men’s aptitudes and 
inclinations. The effect is wrought partly by a coercive, 
educational adaptation of the habits of all individuals, partly by 
a selective elimination of the unfit individuals and lines of 
descent.” 
In recognising that institutions can ‘shape … habits of 
thought’ and enforce a ‘coercive, educational adaptation’ on 
individuals, Veblen was adopting a strong and reconstitutive sense of 
what today is called ‘downward causation’ (Campbell, 1974; Sperry, 
1991; Hodgson, 2003, 2004). Veblen (1899, p. 246) repeated this 
idea in several places, writing for instance that ‘the scheme of life, of 
conventions, acts selectively and by education to shape the human 
material’. 
The idea of downward causation has been criticised for 
supposing that higher-level processes somehow cause lower-level 
physical laws to be violated (Kim, 1993). In terms of the interaction of 
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agency and social structure, objections would rightly be raised 
against the idea of ‘social forces’ or ‘economic laws’ themselves acting 
directly upon the intentions of agents. If the social or cultural can 
affect the individual, then it does so through causes that operate 
upon the individual at the psychological level. If it is to be 
acceptable, the concept of reconstitutive downward causation does 
not rely on unexplained or mysterious types of cause or causality. 
In clarifying his position, Nobel Laureate Roger Sperry (1991, 
p. 230) rightly insisted that ‘the higher-level phenomena in exerting 
downward control do not disrupt or intervene in the causal relations 
of the downward-level component activity’. We are thus obliged to 
explain particular human behaviour in terms of causal processes 
operating at the individual level, such as individual aspirations, 
dispositions or constraints. Where higher-level factors enter, is in the 
more general explanation of the system-wide processes giving rise to 
those aspirations, dispositions or constraints. 
Accordingly, at the level of the human agent, there are no 
magical ‘cultural’ or ‘economic’ forces controlling individuals, other 
than those affecting the dispositions, thoughts and actions of 
individual human actors. People do not develop new preferences, 
wants or purposes because mysterious ‘social forces’ control them. 
Following Veblen, what have to be examined are the social and 
psychological mechanisms leading to such changes of preference, 
disposition or mentality. It is through these mechanisms that social 
power is exercised over individuals. 
What does happen is that the framing, shifting and 
constraining capacities of social institutions give rise to new 
perceptions and dispositions within individuals. Upon new habits of 
thought and behaviour, new preferences and intentions emerge. But 
we need to know how habits are changed. Veblen (1899, p. 190, 
emphasis added) was specific about the psychological mechanisms 
involved: ‘The situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow 
through a selective, coercive process, by acting upon men’s habitual 
view of things’. 
The crucial point in the argument here is to recognise the 
significance of reconstitutive downward causation on habits, rather 
than merely on behaviour, intentions or preferences. Clearly, the 
definitional distinction between habit (as a propensity or disposition) 
and behaviour (or action) is essential to make sense of this 
statement.7 But a second point is also of vital significance. Habit and 
instinct are foundational to the human personality. Reason, 
deliberation and calculation emerge only after specific habits have 
 
7 The case for defining habit as a disposition is made in Hodgson (2004), 
where others adopting this conception are listed. 
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been laid down; their operation depends upon such habits. In turn, 
the development of habits depends upon prior instincts. Instincts, by 
definition, are inherited. Accordingly, reconstitutive downward 
causation upon instincts is not possible. Reconstitutive downward 
causation works by creating and moulding habits. Habit is the 
crucial and hidden link in the causal chain. 
Clearly, institutions may directly affect our choices, by 
providing incentives, sanctions or constraints. For example, we 
decide to drive within the speed limit because we see a police patrol 
car on the road. However, the particular intention is explained in 
terms of the existing preference to avoid punishment. This 
explanation does not itself involve a reconstitutive process. In 
contrast, to provide a reconstitutive causal mechanism, we have to 
point to factors that are foundational to purposes, preferences and 
deliberation as a whole. This is where habits come in. By affecting 
habits, institutions can indirectly influence our purposes or 
preferences. As long as we can explain how institutional structures 
give rise to new or changed habits, then we have an acceptable 
mechanism of reconstitutive downward causation. 
In this manner it is possible to overcome the dilemma 
between methodological individualism and methodological 
collectivism. By acting not directly on individual decisions, but on 
habitual dispositions, institutions exert downward causation without 
reducing individual agency to their effects. Furthermore, upward 
causation, from individuals to institutions, is still possible, without 
assuming that the individual is given or immanently conceived. 
Again and again Veblen described how institutional changes acted 
upon individual habits of thought and behaviour. The concept of 
habit was central to his understanding of how institutions affect 
individual dispositions and behaviour, and how social power is 
exercised. 
The broader idea that social institutions can in some way 
affect individual purposes or preferences became thematic for 
institutional economics as a whole. For example, Wesley Mitchell 
(1924, p. 24) saw money as an institution that ‘makes us all react in 
standard ways to the standard stimuli it offers, and affects our very 
ideals of what is good, beautiful and true.’ John R. Commons (1934, 
p. 698) likewise made it clear that ‘not only the physical framework 
of the body, but also the spiritual framework of the mind, becomes 
institutionally habituated to the dominant ways of doing things’. 
Although this broad idea is thematic for institutionalism it is not 
confined to it. For example, Alfred Marshall (1949, p. 76) wrote 
repeatedly in his Principles of ‘the development of new activities 
giving rise to new wants’. But no one was more careful than Veblen 
to specify the causal mechanisms of habituation, through which 
institutions can affect the very personality of the individual. A 
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general statement of reconstitutive downward causation follows. This 
sixth principle of social theory, is actually an extension of the 
principle (c) above: 
(f) Reconstitutive downward causation. The causal powers 
associated with social structures may not simply impede or constrain 
behaviour, but may also affect and alter fundamental properties, 
powers and propensities of individuals. When an upper hierarchical 
level affects components at a lower level in this manner, this may be 
seen as a special and stronger case of ‘downward causation’ that we 
may term as reconstitutive downward causation. Those particular 
social structures that have the capacity for substantial, enduring 
and widespread reconstitutive downward causation upon individuals 
are termed institutions. 
Principle (c) asserts that social structure can affect individual 
behaviour. Principle (f) goes further, by upholding that social 
structure can also affect the fundamental properties of the 
individual. Taken together, the third and sixth principles are the 
symmetrical reverse of the first principle; for the first principle 
upholds – less controversially – that individuals can help to 
reconstitute the fundamental properties of some social structures. 
Overall, these six principles of social theory amount to the 
extension of evolutionary possibilities into the social domain. At the 
same time, they uphold that individuals and social structures are 
mutually constitutive, thus excluding both methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism, as defined here. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This essay emphasises that Darwinism has important 
philosophical implications for the social sciences. These implications 
were recognised by Veblen more than a hundred years ago. In 
particular, Darwinism involves a commitment to causal explanations 
and evolutionary explanations of origin. These principles apply to, on 
the one hand, individuals and their preferences, and on the other 
hand, social structures. Accordingly, any approach that takes either 
individuals or social structures as given is inadequate. In this way, 
Veblenian economics rules out both methodological individualism 
and methodological collectivism, at least in the manner defined here. 
On the positive side, Darwinism points to the application of 
principles of selection and replication to social units such as habits, 
routines and institutions, as pioneered by Veblen (1919), and revived 
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